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CONJOINED TWINS:
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PARENTS AND THE COURTS
OVER THE MEDICAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN
Heather Tierney*
I. INTRODUCTION

The anomaly of conjoined twins fascinates and amazes people around the
world. Conjoined twins are the subject of television documentaries and a source of
curiosity and amazement.1 With advances in medical treatment more conjoined
twins survive birth.2 Parents of conjoined twins immediately face life and death
decisions concerning their new babies. The most difficult of these decisions is
whether or not to separate the twins. Medically, legally, and ethically the
occurrence and survival of conjoined twins is an interesting and controversial
topic. As Nancy Segal, an expert on twins and twinning, stated "[p]ublic debates
on the physical and psychological treatment of conjoined twins have engaged
physicians, families and reporters in triadic tangles3 over pregnancy termination,
surgical separation, and postoperative management.,
In August of 2000, the first legal case involving the surgical separation of

*B.A. DePauw University, 1997; J.D. University of Denver College of Law, 2002;
M.A. University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies, 2002.
1. Conjoined twins were once known as Siamese twins.
See Conjoined Twins, at
www.twinstuff.com/conjoined.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2001). The most famous set of conjoined
twins, Eng and Chang Bunker, were born on May 10, 1811 and died within hours of each other on
January 17, 1864 at age 62. See id. The brothers were successful businessmen in North Carolina and
fathered at least twenty-one children between them. See id. The twins married sisters and traveled
around the world with Barnum's circus to earn money. See id. After their death doctors determined
that the twins could have been successfully separated because they were attached by only a five-inch
ligament near their breastbones. See id. See also KAY HUNTER, DUET FOR A LIFETIME (1964). See
also DARIN STRAUSS, CHANG AND ENG (2001).
2. "At one end of the spectrum is the case of two fully grown, fully equipped bodies with a minor
connection which is easy to remove, leaving two complete individuals who could survive into old age.
At the other end is one complete body with a number of extra parts which could be removed to leave
just one complete individual. Between these two extremes are a range of gradations including two
fairly complete bodies, which are so heavily fused that they cannot be separated but at a substantial risk;
and two, which can be separated with the inevitable consequence that one of them will die." Sally
Sheldon & Stephen Wilkinson, Conjoined Twins: The Legality and Ethics Of Sacrifice, 2 MED. L. REV.
149, 150 (1997).
3. See NANCY L. SEGAL, ENTWINED LIVES: TWINS AND WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 303 (2000).
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conjoined twins arrived in a British courtroom . The case involved a fundamental
dispute about medical care and the separation of conjoined twins which divided the
scientific, legal and religious sectors of society.5 The doctors believed the twins
should be separated giving the stronger, viable twin an opportunity to live. The
devoutly religious parents believed that the decision regarding whether the children
lived or died should be left in God's hands.6 In their view no one should
intentionally cause the death of another person.",
This comment explores how the courts in the United States might review a
conjoined twins case such as the one of Jodie and Mary. As a starting point, this
comment closely examines the facts and the judicial treatment by the Appeals
Court in Britain of Jodie and Mary's case. This analysis examines the opinions of
each Justice on the Court of Appeals as well as the Court's decision. The second
part analyzes how courts in the United States treat medical cases where children
either receive extraordinary medical treatment over the advice of their doctor. This
comment explores the well known case of Baby K, a baby born without brain
function in October, 1992. 7 This includes the judicial treatment by the trial court,
as well as the court of appeals. Lastly, this comment address cases where parents
refuse medical treatment for their minor children because of their religious beliefs.
This comment analyzes both the differences and the similarities in cases
where medical treatment is sought to save life and cases in which parents refuse
medical treatment on religious grounds. In addition to the case analysis, this
comment contemplates the effect of parent's constitutional rights under the free
exercise clause, the rights of children in terms of child abuse and neglect, the
parent's rights in terms of child abuse and neglect, as well as the state's right to
intervene.
II. JODIE AND MARY - BACKGROUND

Jodie and Mary were born on August 8, 2000.8 The children were born to

4. Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) No. 1, [2000] H.R.L.R. 721
(C.A.Civ.); In re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), [2001] Fam. 147 (C.A. Civ.); Re
A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. Civ.) [hereinafter
Conjoined Twins Case].
5. See John L. Allen Jr., Sophie's Choice Conjoined Twins Give Birth to Moral and Legal
Debate, at http://www.parkridgecenter.org.
6. See Lisa M. Hewitt, A (Children): Conjoined Twins and Their Medical Treatment, 3 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 207, 209-210 (2001) (reviewing the decision by the Appeals Court).
7. See In the Matter of Baby "K", 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993) [hereinafter In the Matter
of Baby "K"].
8. These are fictional names given by the court. The girls' real names are Gracie and Rose. See
Law Decreed Fate of Jodie and Mary, THE GuARDIAN, Feb. 5, 2002. George J. Annas, Conjoined
Twins-The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life, 344 N. Eng. J. Med. 1104 (2001). The parents are
Kosovar refugees who now live on Gozo. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 727. The mother
discovered at four months that she was carrying conjoined twins. Id. (quoting from the parents
statement). In their homeland the termination of any pregnancy is illegal. See id. The doctors in Gozo
recommended St. Mary's Hospital in Manchester. Id. The government established links with the
British government, which allows patients to be treated by the National Health Service and be
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Michaelangelo and Rina Attard, devout Roman Catholics. 9 Jodie and Mary were
ischiopagus tetrapus conjoined twins. 10 Thus, each had their own arms and legs,
although they were joined at the pelvis and shared a linked spine." The girls had
their own internal organs, except for a shared bladder.' 2 Jodie's heart and lungs
performed all of the circulatory functions for both girls.' 3 A common, shared
artery enabled Jodie to circulate oxygenated blood for both of them. 14 The strain of
supporting both girls would result in the death of both twins within a matter of

reimbursed by their government. See id.
9. See Annas, supra note 8, at 1104.
10. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 728. Ischiopagus twins are joined at the ischium and
tetrapus twins have four lower limbs. See id. The girls bodies are merged, with their legs emerging at
right angles from each side and their heads at opposite ends. See Judges Rule Conjoined Twins Can Be
Separated, Sept. 22, 2000 at http://www.cnn.comi2000/WORLD/europe/UK/09/22/britain.twins.03 (last
visited Apr. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Judges Rule]. Ischiopagus twins account for only 6% of all
conjoined twins. See Conjoined Twins at www.twinstuff.com/conjoined.htm (last visited Apr. 26,
2001) (describing the occurrence of conjoined twins and the different types of conjoined twins, as well
as a history on the most famous sets of conjoined twins). The most common form of conjoined twins
are thoraopagus which account for 35-40% of all cases. Id. Thorapagus twins share part of the chest
wall and sometimes share a heart. Id. Conjoined twins are extremely rare and are always identical,
same-sex twins, 70% being female.
Id.
See also Types of Conjoined Twins,
http://zygote.swathmore.edu/cleave4a.html (last modified Apr. 5, 1996). There are no documented
cases of conjoined triplets or quadruplets. See id. See also Conjoined Twins, infra note 10. However,
there are cases of conjoined twins in triplet and quadruplet sets. See SEGAL, supra note 3, at 296.
Furthermore, conjoined twins are less likely to occur in the United States or China than in India or
Africa. See How Are Conjoined Twins Formed? at http://www.conjoined-twins.i-p.com/how.html (last
visited Apr. 26, 2001); See also SEGAL, supra note 3, at 301 (reviewing a study regarding the
occurrence of conjoined twins in different parts of the world. The study also investigates the effect of
the environment). Conjoined twins occur as often as once in every 40,000 births but only once in every
200,000 live births. See How Are Conjoined Twins Formed, infra note 10. Seventy-five percent of
conjoined twins are still born or die within 24 hours. Id. They are the product of a single egg that, for
some unknown reason, failed to divide fully into separate twins during the first three weeks of
gestation. See Claudia Wallis, The Most Intimate Bond: Conjoinedfor Life, the Hensel Twins are a
Medical Mystery and a Lesson in Cooperation For Us All, TIME MAG., Mar. 25, 1996, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/arhchive/1996/dom/960325/medicine.html
(last visited Aug. 10,
2001). The mother of Jodie and Mary went into spontaneous labor at 42 weeks. See Judges Rule, infra
note 10. The parents wanted little intervention during delivery so the doctor delivered the children at
the last possible moment by Caesarean section. See id.
11. Annas, supra note 8, at 1104. See also Christopher Kaczor, The Tragic Case of Jodie and
Mary: Questions about Separating Conjoined Twins, http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/faculty/
ckaczor/articles/twins.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2001). Justice Ward described the twins from
photographs. "Jodie's head seems normal but Mary's is obviously enlarged, for she has a swelling at
the back of the head and neck, she is facially dysmorphic and blue because she is centrally cyanosed."
Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 729.
12. See Hewitt, supra note 6, at 208.
13. Kaczor, supra note 11. Mary grew at a normal rate while Jodie did not grow. See Hewitt,
supra note 6, at 208. The doctors suggested, "Mary is drawing nutrition from Jodie, and growing at her
expense." Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 732.
14. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4 at 726 (describing Mary's and Jodie's situation). The
separation of the twins would involve severing this artery, which would result in Mary's death. See id.
If the girls are not separated they could live as long as six months and perhaps longer. See id. Jodie's
heart will eventually fail leading to the death of both girls. See id.
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weeks.15 As the stronger twin, Jodie
could survive on her own if separated from
16
Mary but Mary would certainly die.
The parents believed that God, not doctors, should decide whether their
daughters lived or died.' 7 The parents declined St. Mary's Hospital's offer to
perform the operation to separate the girls.' 8 In their eyes, the twins were equal in
the eyes of their parents, so they would not sacrifice one to save the other.' 9 As a
result, the twins' doctors turned to the court to order the surgery over the
objections of the parents. 20
III. IN RE A (CHILDREN) - THE DECISION OF THE BRITISH APPEALS PANEL
In British courts, Lord Justices on an appeals panel customarily issue separate
opinions. 21 The Lord Justices agreed with the trial court judge's decision to
separate the girls. 22 The appeals panel justices did not agree with the Family
Division's justices legal reasoning, as well as each other's legal reasoning as to the
legality of the operation to separate the girls. 23 Interestingly, the Lord Justices
quoted Justice Scalia in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health24 where the
15. See Kaczor, supra note II (doctors predicted this result). See also Daniel P. Sulmasy, Heart
and Soul: The Case of Conjoined Twins, http://www.americapress.org/articles/sulmasy.htm (last visited
Aug. 10, 2001) (stating that the doctors decision to separate the twins as the only medically proper
decision was hasty). The fact that the doctors do not have thousands of cases in which to compare this
case means they were not speaking from experience. Id. The author questions the assumptions by
doctors that both girls would die without the surgery. ld. Furthermore, the doctors also questioned the
probability of success of the surgery to separate the girls at 80%. Id. Also questioned is the decision
not to try a heart and lung transplant for Mary, although the author recognized that there is not enough
medical knowledge to determine if this was possible. Id.
16. Annas, supra note 8, at 1104. Approximately 200 surgical separations of conjoined twins
were attempted, approximately 90% of these after 1950. See SEGAL, supra note 3, at 306-307. Since
1950 three quarters of the surgeries have resulted in one or both of the twins surviving. Id.
17. See Judges Rule, supra note 10. Choosing to save Jodie at the cost of Mary's life would be
ending a life, directly conflicting with the parents' religious views. See The Separating of Conjoined
Twins: A Human Life has the Greatest Value, but its Loss May be Justified,
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/fuIll/321/7264/782 (last visited Aug. 10, 2001) [hereinafter The
Separation of Conjoined Twins].
18. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 726. As devout Roman Catholics, they believe,
"that it is God's will that their children are afflicted as they are and they must be left in God's hands."
Id.
19. Id.
20. See Hewitt, supra note 6, at 210. The parents entered an "originating summons" with the
High Court. Id.
21. See Annas, supra note, 8 at 1104.
22. Id. at 1104. The Justices commented on the personal difficulties each had in reaching a
decision. See The Separation of Conjoined Twins, supra note 17. The Justices made comments about
experiencing many sleepless nights agonizing over their decision. Id.
23. Annas, supra note 8, at 1104.
24. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The court determined that it does not violate the Constitution to
implement the wishes of the appointed surrogate even if there is not clear and convincing evidence of a
patient's wish to have medical care withdrawn. Id. at 292. The predecessor to this case is the Quinlan
case. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). In the Quinlan case, Karen Quinlan suffered
from severe brain damage causing a permanent vegetative state. Her parents wanted her respirator
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United States (U.S.) Supreme Court Determined the
legality of a parent's decision
25
to end life sustaining treatment for their daughter.
According to the "welfare principle" the British court had the right to override
the decision of the parents if it is in the best interests of the child to do so. 26 This
principle puts the child's welfare above parental interest. 27 The judges decide if it
is in the child's best interest to have "an independent and objective judgment. 28
This differs from the U.S., where the only way to override a decision by the
parents is to convince a judge that it was a case of abuse or neglect. 29 The issue in
this case was whether the parents could refuse medical treatment for their
daughters. The Family Division court determined that the parents could refuse
medical treatment, but the doctor's request to operate on the girls was in their best
interest, therefore overriding the decision of the parents.30
The Family Division judge concluded "that separation was not a case of
killing Mary but one of passive euthanasia in which her food and hydration would
be withdrawn (by clamping off her blood supply from Jodie).,, 31 The parents and
the official solicitor, appointed
to represent Mary's interest, appealed the judgment
32
of the Family Division Court
A. Lord Justice Alan Ward
British Appeals Court Justice Ward addressed the court's ability to hear the
case. 33 The parents are entitled to consent or reject medical treatment on behalf of
a minor child if it is in the child's best interest. 34 The hospital has the right to ask
the court to overturn the parent's decision and give consent to the operation.3
The fundamental principal of medical law allows people the opportunity to
decide for themselves whether or not to receive medical treatment.36 This principal

disconnected. Id. at 37-39, 662-64. The Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed Quinlan's parents to
make the decision. Id. at 39, 664. The Court believed that this was the only way to ensure that
Quinlan's privacy rights under the Federal Constitution would be preserved. Id.
25. "The point at which life becomes 'worthless' and the point at which the means necessary to
preserve it become extraordinary or inappropriate are neither set forth in the constitution not known to
the nine Justices of this Court any better then they are known to nine people picked at random from the
Kansas City phone directory." 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990).
26. See The Separating of Conjoined Twins, supra note 17.
27. Id.
28. See George J. Annas, The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life: Lessons from Cannibalism,
Euthanasia, Abortion, and the Court-OrderedKilling of One Conjoined Twin to Save the Other, 33
CONN. L. REv. 1275, 1282 (2001).
29. Id.
30. See Conjoined Twins Case supra note 4, at 747.
31. See Annas, supra note 8, at 1104. See Conjoined Twins Case, supranote 4, at 748.
32. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 736.
33. See Annas, supra note 8, at 1104.
34. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 751-752.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 748.
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unreasonableness of the decision. 37 In the case of
exists allowing the court to override the parents'
best interest. 38 The parents have a right and duty to
or withhold medical treatment.39

Family law dictated the test to determine whether the parents refusal can be
overridden. 40 The Courts paramount consideration is the welfare of the child.4'
Lord Justice Ward addressed Jodie's best interest first and agreed with Justice
Johnson in the Family Court that it was in Jodie's best interest to have the
operation.42 The operation would allow Jodie to have a normal life expectancy
with little risk of brain damage of death.43 He stated.. ."it seems to me impossible
to say that this operation does not offer infinitely greater benefit to Jodie than is
offered to her by letting her die if the operation is not performed."
45
Determining Mary's best interest was more difficult for Lord Justice Ward.
The critical distinction was whether the operation was viewed as a prolongation of
Mary's life or a termination of her life. 4 The important consideration in respect to
Mary was that her condition would never improve.47 There was no determination
as to whether or not she was in pain and that prolonging her life would be to her
disadvantage.4 8
In determining Mary's best interest, Lord Justice Ward recognized that there
was no best health interest. 49 He determined that, "the operation is not capable of
enduring any other improvement in her condition or preventing any deterioration
in her present state of health.",50 He concluded that Mary's life has value even if
she did not have the capacity to enjoy it. 5 ' The Lord Justice determined that the
operation was not in Mary's best interest because it would end her life
prematurely. 52 There was no advantage to her because the operation was in Jodie's
but not Mary's best interest.53 In cases considering the best interest of two
children, the court must first balance the matter relevant to each child.54 The

37. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 749.
38. Id. at 751. The parents did not contest the court's ability to review their decision. Id.
39. Id. at 752.
40. Id. The Court used best interests and welfare interchangeably.
41. Id. at 755.
42. Id. at 756.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 757.
47. Id. at 756.
48. Id. This was part of Justice Johnson's decision.
49. Id. at 757.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 761. Lord Justice Ward disagreed with Justice Johnson that Mary's life was worth
nothing to her. Id.
52. Id. at 764.
53. Id.
54. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 30:4

wishes of the parents are considered in finding this balance. 5 5
The important distinction addressed by Lord Justice Ward is the withdrawl of
care or treatment verses the ending of a patient's life by lethal injection. 6 He
quoted Lord Goff, stating:
The distinction appears, therefore, to be useful in the present context in that it can
be invoked to explain how the discontinuance of life support can be differentiated
from ending a patient's life by lethal injection. But in that end the reason for that
difference is that, whereas law considers that discontinuance of life support may
be consistent with the doctor's duty to care for his patient, it does not, for reasons
of policy, consider that it forms anyTart
of his duty to five his patient a lethal
5
injection to put him out of his agony.
B. Lord Justice Brooke
Lord Justice Brooke agreed with Lord Justice Ward's determination that when
balancing the girls' interests against each other, Mary's interests should not
outweigh the interests of Jodie. 8 He determined that the issues involving criminal
law were the most difficult. The most important question was whether or not the
operation to separate the girls was lawful. 59 He looked at the legal definition of
murder, as well as the exceptions. 60 The Lord Justice focused on the words and
phrases important to this
case: "unlawfully," "kills," "any reasonable creature,"
61
and "with intent to kill.
Lord Justice Brooke analyzed the meaning of the word "kills. 62 He used the
case of Airedale NHS Trust v. Blanct 3 where the House of Lords made an
important distinction between a doctor's decision not to prolong a life through
treatment and a doctor's decision to end a life by administering a lethal drug.64
Withholding medical treatment is lawful in situations where the patient gave
consent and in some circumstances where the patient did not give consent. 65
Conversely, the doctor may not administer a drug to bring about death, even in
circumstances of extreme suffering. 66 A positive act can be categorized as

55. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 765.
56. Id. at 763.
57. Id at 762.
58. Id. at 779. Lord Justice Brooke agree with Lord Justice Ward's analysis in terms of family
law. Id. Lord Justice Brooke adopts Lord Justice Ward's description of the facts as well but considered
the literature before the court valuable in deciding the issues of the case.
59. Id. at 784.
60. Id. Lord Justice Brooke concluded that the exceptions were irrelevant in this case. Id.
61. Id.at 786.
62. Id. at 788.
63. [19931 A.C. 789.
64. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 788-89. This is the decision the House of Lords faced
in the Airedale case.
65. Id. at 789 (discussing the Airedale case).
66. Id. The House of Lords called this form of killing euthanasia. Euthanasia is unlawful at
common law.
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murder.67
Lord Justice Ward discussed the defense of necessity and attempted to draw
an analogy to when "murder" may be necessary. 68 He relied on Sir James
Stephen's requirements for the application of the doctrine of necessity. 69 First, the
act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil.70 Second, the lawful killing
should be no more than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved.7'
Third, the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.72
In weighing the factors, Lord Justice Brooke turned to the case of Regina v.
Dudley & Stephens73 to demonstrate the doctrine of necessity. In Dudley, a four
member crew escaped their sinking yacht with only two tins of turnips.

74

After

eight days without food, Dudley and Stephens killed the youngest and weakest
crew member.75 The rest of the crew ate him to survive and four days later the
crew members were rescued.76 At their trial for murder, Dudley and Stephens
argued that they killed the other crew member out of necessity. 77 The Court's
opinion questions the doctrine of necessity and the Court determined that the
crew's actions were murder and that their actions could not be justified by
necessity, "[b]y what
necessity.78 Most importantly when applying the doctrine 7of
9
measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured.
Lord Justice Brooke determined that even though Mary's death would
constitute murder, Sir James Stephen's requirements for the application of the
doctrine of necessity justified the surgery.80 Lord Justice Brooke concluded that
Jodie's interest in life must outweigh Mary's conflicting interest.8'

67. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 789. In the Airedale case the House of Lords
determined that cutting off life prolonging treatment was not a positive act and therefore did not fall
under the law of murder.
68. Id. at 794.
69. Id. at 816.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
74. Id.
75. Id. Dudley and Stephens did not inform the other crew member, Brooks, of their plans. Id.
Dudley and Stephens choose the boy because they both had families. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 287. Lord Coleridge states, "Though law and morality are not the same, and many
things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from morality
would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce would follow if the temptation to murder in this case
were to be held by law an absolute defense of it." Id. He determined that it is not always necessary to
preserve life. Id. For example, lives are sacrificed in war. Id.
79. Id.
80. Conjoined Twins Case, supra, note 4, at 815.
81. Id. at 816. He also argued in the doctrine of sanctity of life and that the operation to separate
the girls would give the girl's bodies the integrity denied to them by nature. Id.
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C. Lord Justice Robert Walker

Lord Justice Robert Walker recognized two central questions in this case.
82
First, are these conjoined twins two persons or one in the eyes of the law?
Second, if they are two persons, was Mary born alive?13 This second question was
important because there is no criminal liability if she was not born alive.84 Lord
Justice Walker believed they should be regarded as two separate people.8 5 Mary
did not fall within the definition of a still-born child as defined by the Births and
Deaths Registration Act of 1965.86 The Lord Justice points out that the Children
Act 87 requires the Court to consider the best interests of each child.8 8 In cases
where the Court looks at the well being of two siblings, it must89balance the
interests of the children and achieve the "situation of least detriment.,
Lord Justice Walker considered the parents' opinion about the future of their
children. Their sincere religious beliefs though controversial, are unlike Jehovah's
Witnesses objections to blood transfusions because they are not contrary to
society's generally accepted views. 90 In addition, their views are supported by the
society in which they live. 91 Lord Justice Walker understood the doctor's assertion
that the surgery was the best way to save Jodie and that this must be respected,
even though the Justices or Court of Appeals could not determine the legality of
the operation.92
Lord Justice Walker agreed with the determination of Lord Justice Brooks
that the doctrine of necessity was important in this case, but found no helpful
parallel case.93 Ultimately, Lord Justice Walker found that the doctor's testimony
that the operation was in the best interest of both twins persuasive and agreed with
the decision
to allow the surgery. 94 The parents choose not to appeal the court's
95
decision.

82. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 817.
83. Id. at 818.
84. Id.
85. Id. This was more than parasitic attachment. Id. The girls each had a brain and almost
complete bodies. Id.
86. Id. A child which has issued forth from its mother after the twenty-forth week of pregnancy
and which did not at any time after being completely expelled from its mother breathe or show any
signs of life. Id. Mary struggled to breathe. Id.
87. Children's Act, 1989, sec. 3 (Eng.).
88. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 819.
89. Id. See In Re H 1 FLR 883 (1993). Cases that have involved the balancing of interests have
not been decisions as a matter of life or death. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 819.
90. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 821.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 835.
94. Id. at 836.
95. Id.
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D. Holding
Six weeks after the Court of Appeal's dismissal of the parents appeal the
hospital performed the operation separating Jodie and Mary.96 As expected, Mary
died during surgery. 97 Jodie needs extensive surgery in the99 next few years, but
98
could recover fully. She returned to Gozo with her parents.
IV. THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF BABY K

The case of Baby K presented a situation where the wishes of the doctors and
parents collided.1l ° As in the case of Jodie and Mary, the parents and doctors
disagreed about what should be done with their babies. On October 13, 1992,
Baby K was born by cesarean
section in Falls Church, Virginia.' 0 ' Baby K was
10 2
anencephalic.
as
diagnosed
Immediately after birth, Baby K was put on ventilation. The doctors urged
the mother to discontinue respiratory methods because there was no chance of
long-term survival for Baby K. 10 3 The physician treating Baby K sought advice
from the hospital ethics committee, as well as a subcommittee composed of a
family practitioner, a psychiatrist, and a minister.'1 4 The subcommittee decided
that a legal remedy would be sought if the impasse continued between the doctors

96. Annas, supranote 8 at 1106. The surgery took twenty hours. SeeSulmasy, supra note 15.
97. Annas, supranote 8, at 1106.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Baby K's real name was Stephanie Harrell. See Cindy Hylton Rushton, The Baby K Case:
Ethical Challengesof PreservingProfessionalIntegrity, 21 PEDIATRIC NURSING 367 (1995).
101. See George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care-The Case of
Baby K, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1542 (1994) [hereinafter Asking the Courts].
102. Anencephaly is "the congenital absence of major portions of the brain, skull, and scalp
characterized by a large opening in the skull accompanied by the absence or severe disruption of the
cerebral hemispheres." See The Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant With Anencephaly,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669 (1990). The infants are permanently unconscious and have some responses
to stimuli. See id. A low percentage of infants born with anencephaly survive more than a week after
birth. See id. Each year approximately 1,000 infants are born with this condition. See Carol J.
Castaneda, Baby K Now Stephanie Turns 2, USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 1994. She had a brain stem, which
functioned allowing her to have respiratory reflexes, minimal feeling reflexes and reflexive responses to
noxious stimuli. See Hylton Rushton, supra note 100, at 367. Baby K was diagnosed parentally, but
her mother would not agree to terminate the pregnancy despite the advice of her doctors. See Asking
the Courts, supra note 101, at 1542. She declined to have an abortion because of her devout Christian
beliefs. See Karen R. Long, Whose Life is it Anyway? Debate Rages on Baby K Kept Alive for Two
Years, Child Cannot See, Hear, Think or Feel, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 9, 1994. The father of the
baby sided with the hospital and believed that care should be discontinued. See id. The parents were
unmarried and the father was less involved in the case. See id.
103. See ResuscitationRequired, CourtSays, BALT. EVENING SUN, Oct. 4, 1994. The baby did not
interact with her environment and was permanently unconscious. See Hylton Rushton, supra note 100,
at 367. She did not see, feel, hear, talk, think or feel pain. Id.
104. Asking the Courts, supra note 101, at 1562. The mother had a strong religious belief that all
life has value and should be preserved." See Life and Law in the Case of Baby K, THE VIRGINIANPILOT AND THE LEDGER-STAR, Oct. 6, 1994.
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and the mother.' 0 5 On November 30"', 1992 the hospital transferred Baby K to a
nursing home, but agreed that if respiratory difficulties reoccurred she would be
immediately returned to the hospital. 0 6 Baby K returned to the hospital in January
and two additional times after that. 0 7 Fairfax hospital took the case of Baby K to
federal court. The hospital requested the court to determine whether it could
discontinue life sustaining treatment in the event that Baby K arrived at the
emergency department in emergency distress. 108
The hospital sought a declaration that the refusal to provide life-supporting
medical care to Baby K would not transgress the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act' 0 9 (EMTALA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,"" the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),'" the Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984, 12 and the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act." 3 The Court refused to
make any legal rulings concerning the rights or obligations of the hospital under
the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and under the Virginia Medical Malpractice
Act. 114
Under EMTALA, the hospital wanted an exemption from the requirements of
the statute when the treatment is deemed by hospital physicians to be "futile" or
,,inhumane.,iIs According to the court, the exceptions the hospital sought under
EMTALA did not apply in the case of Baby K.116 The federal court determined
that the treatment of acute symptoms of respiratory difficulty by the use of a
mechanical ventilator is not "futile" or "inhumane."" 17 The court reasoned that this
was similar to refusing an AIDS or cancer patient medical treatment after an
accident on the grounds that because they will die anyway the care would be
"futile."1 i18

"The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against an 'otherwise
qualified' handicapped individual, solely by reason of his or her handicap, under

105. Life and Law in the Case of Baby K, supra note 104. The father ofBaby K was only distantly
involved.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See In the Matter of Baby "K,"supra note 7,at 1022. See also Hylton Rushton, supra note
100, at 367. See also Asking the Courts, supra note 101, at 1542.
109. In the Matter of Baby "K", supra note 7, at 1022; Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd [hereinafter EMTALA].
110. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Act required that participating hospitals
provide stabilizing medical treatment to any person who comes to an emergency department in an
"emergency medical condition" when treatment is requested on that person's behalf. See EMTALA,
supra note 109.
111. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
112. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 5102 etseq.
113. Virginia Medical Malpractice Act, VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1 et seq.
114. In the Matter of Baby "K", supranote 7, at 1031.
115. Id. at 1027.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." ' 19 Baby K falls
within the definition of a "handicapped" and "disabled" person and she was
initially denied treatment over the objections of her mother because
of her
12
handicap. 120 The withholding of ventilator treatment is against the Act.
The court then turned to the ADA. The ADA "prohibits discrimination
against disabled individuals by 'public accommodations.""1 22 Under the ADA.
Anencephaly is a disability and public accommodations include heath care
providers. 23 It differs from the Rehabilitation Act in that, "the ADA does not
require an individual to be 'otherwise qualified' to receive benefits.' ' 124 The Court
determined that "the ADA does not permit the denial of ventilator services that
would keep alive an anencephalic baby when those life-saving services would
be
125
otherwise be provided to a baby without disabilities at the parent's request."'
In addition to these statutes, the court looked last at the constitutional and
common law issues surrounding the case. Various issues arose because Baby K's
father and guardian ad litem opposed the continuation of medical treatment and
wanted to override the wishes of the baby's mother. 12 6 The Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause protects a parent's constitutional right to "bring up
children."' 127 In addition, decisions made for children based on a parent's free
exercise of religion are guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 28 Furthering parental rights, parents retain the medical authority to
seek medical care for minor children (even if it impinges on the child's liberty
interest) absent a finding of abuse or neglect.' 29 The court recognized a
presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child because the
"natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children."' 30
The court pointed to the hospital's failure to provide clear and convincing
evidence that the mother's decision should not be respected because it constituted
severe abuse and neglect. 3' Accordingly, the court denied the hospital's request
for a declaratory judgment that they would not violate the EMTALA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA. 32 In addition, according to EMTALA and the
Rehabilitation Act, the hospital was required to provide ventilator treatment to

119. In the Matter of Baby "K", supranote 7, at1027.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1028.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1029.
126. Id. at 1030. The guardian atlitem was appointed on the hospitals motion. Id. at 1026.
127. Id. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
128. Id. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
129. Id. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04.
130. See Parham, supra note 129, at 602.
131. In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7, at 1031. The clear and convincing standard was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan. Cruzan, supra note 24, at 284.
132. See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7, at 1026.
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Baby K. 33
'
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed he judgment of the District
Court and noted that EMTALA, "gives rise to a duty on the part of the hospital to
provide respiratory support to Baby K when she is presented at the Hospital in
respiratory distress and treatment is requested for her."' 3 4 The court refused to
address the hospital's obligations under the other federal statutes and the laws of
35
Virginia because there was a duty to render treatment under EMTALA1
Furthermore, the Court determined "[iut is beyond the limits of our judicial
function to address the moral and ethical propriety36 of providing emergency
stabilizing medical treatment to anencephalic infants." 1
The Court of Appeals specifically addressed the hospital's four arguments,
agreeing with the District Courts analysis of the applicable statutes. 37 First, the
hospital argued that EMTALA required that the hospital provide Baby K the care
that other anenecephalic infants received. 138 The court disagreed and determined
that the Act required the hospital to provide stabilizing treatment regardless of the
condition of the patient. 39 Second, the hospital argued that the Act did not require
medical treatment outside the prevailing standard of care.' 40 The Court disagreed
and determined that the hospital was required to stabilize the child. 14 ' Third, the
Court disagreed with the hospital that it was not required to administer
"inappropriate" care.' 42 Lastly, the hospital argued that EMTALA only applied to
patients who were transferred from the hospital in an unstable condition. 43 The
44
court refused to address the moral and ethical treatment of anencephalic infants.'
On October 3, 1994, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case.145
A. Refusal of Medical Treatment
The U.S. courts differentiate between medical treatment for life-threatening
and non life-threatening situations. A court ordered medical treatment for a child
46
when the parent's religious beliefs forbade them to seek life-saving treatment.
When the illness is not life-threatening, courts differ as to whether treatment will
be ordered over the parent's objections. 147 A parent's refusal of life-saving
133. See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7, at 1026.
134. In the Matter of Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Baby "K"].
135. Id. at n.2.
136. Id. at 598.
137. Id. at 595.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 596.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 597.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 598.
145. Baby "K" v. Ms. H., 513 U.S. 825 (1994) (denying the petitioners writ of certiorari).
146. See Laura M. Plastine, "In God We Trust": When Parents Refuse Medical Treatmentfor their
Children Based Upon their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L. J.123, 141-42 (1993).
147. Id. at 145.
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medical treatment for a child because of sincere religious beliefs will be overridden
to ensure that a child receives medical treatment.148 In order to override the wish
of the parents, the state must prove that the life-threatening condition can be
addressed by available medical treatment. 49 Courts generally find that the parents
violated child endangerment and neglect statutes and that the state's interest in
saving the child's life is most important. 50
1. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the federal district court in
Jehovah's Witnesses in Washington v. King County Hospital15 without opinion.
In this case, the hospital gave the minor children of Jehovah's Witnesses blood
transfusions pursuant to court orders. 52 The parents brought suit against the
hospital and the doctors seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the behalf of
all Jehovah's Witnesses residing in the state of Washington. 53 The parents argued
that the practice of making their children wards of the state so that they receive
medical care violated their First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise Clause
and their right of religious freedom of association, as well as other guaranteed
Constitutional rights.'14
The Court applied the holding in Prince, stating that claims of religious
liberty do not outweigh public interest. 55 The Court said, "[a]s stated in Prince,
the right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the child to ill
health or death."' 1 56 The court also stated, "[p]arents may be free to become
martyrs themselves.
But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached 1the
57 age
of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves."'
The Court held, In the Interest ofD.L.E. 58 that "where a minor suffers from a
life-threatening medical condition due to a failure to comply with a program of
medical treatment on religious grounds,.. .permits a finding of dependence and
neglect and does not violate the constitutional provisions protecting the free
exercise of religion."' 159 In this case, the adoptive mother of D.L.E. belonged to the
General Assembly and Church of the First Born and refused medical care for her
148. See People ex. rel. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982). See also Plastine, supra note 146, at
141-42.
149. See People ex.rel. D.L.E., supra note 148, at 271-273.
150. Plastine, supranote 146, at 142-44.
151. Jehovah's Witnesses in Washington v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Wash.
1967), aft'd,390 U.S. 598 (1968) [hereinafter Jehovah's Witnesses].
152. Id. at 498. The court had authority pursuant to provision of the Juvenile Court Law of the
State of Washington. Id. at 499.
153. Id. at 500.
154. Id.
155. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) [hereinafter Prince].
156. Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 151, at 504 (quoting Prince, supra note 155, at 166).
157. Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 151, at 504 (quoting Prince, supra note 155, at 170).
158. People ex. rel. D.L.E., supra note 148.
159. Id. at 276.

DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 30:4

son because of her belief that prayer and assistance by church elders would
improve his condition.' 60 D.L.E. experienced a series of epileptic seizures as a
result of brain damage at birth. 16 1 Doctors ordered D.L.E to take Dilantin which
would control his seizures. 62 The doctors determined this was a life-threatening
situation because
without the medication, D.L.E. was in danger of choking during
163
seizure.
a
D.L.E. and his mother challenged the finding that he was a dependent and
neglected child. 164 The Court rejected their claim of a violation of the
constitutional right to Free Exercise of Religion. 16 5 The Court relied on Prince to
hold that a parent's religious beliefs are not without limitations. 166 The Court also
cited Prince where the Supreme Court determined that, "[t]he right to practice
religion freely does not include
the right or liberty to expose the community or the
167
child to ill health or death."'
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in part
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .,,16
In Prince, the Court balanced the rights
of a parent under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment against the
interest of the state in protecting the health and welfare of its children.' 69 Not only
did Prince claim a freedom of religion right, but also a claim to a parental right
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 The Court
determined that neither the rights of parenthood nor the rights of religion are
beyond limitation. 17' The Court also rejected Princes' claim of freedom of religion
of her child. 172 There still exists an interest in the welfare and well-being of a child
even if she is exercising her First Amendment freedom of religion right. 73
' The
state has the power to limit parental freedom and authority when it effects the
welfare of the child, even if it includes a matter of religious conviction. 74
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

People ex. rel. D.L.E., supra note 148, at 272.
Id.
Id. at 272. Dilantin is an anti-convulsant medication.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 276 (referring to Prince, supra note 155).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
169. See Prince, supra note 155. This was an appeal of a conviction for violating Massachusetts
statute regarding child labor laws. Id. at ?. The defendant appealed on the grounds that she was
exercising her religious convictions in accordance with the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Id. The fact of the case are that Sarah Prince, aunt and at the time of the commitment of
the offenses, the custodian of the nine year old girl, are Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 161. The child
violated a statute which prohibited the sale by children of magazines or newspapers in any street or
public place. Id. at 160-61.
170. Id. at 164. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
17 1. Prince, supra note 155, at 166.
172. Id. The Court compared this to a claim by a parent that a child will not be vaccinated on
religious grounds. Id. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
173. See Prince, supranote 155.
174. Id. at 167.
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2. Application to Mary and Jodie

The case of Baby K presents a case very similar to that of Mary. In both
cases neither child had long term prospects for survival.1 75 As noted, Baby K was
76
born without brain function and would likely not live to see her first birthday. 77
Mary's brain did not fully develop and her condition was unlikely to improve.'
Mary's lungs did not function and she had an enlarged heart that did not receive
any blood flow.' 78 On the other hand, the situation of Jodie is comparable to the
cases in which a parent refuses medical treatment because of religious beliefs.
Jodie could be saved with medical treatment. Her parents' religious beliefs
presented two problems. First, they did not believe in killing one child to save the
other. Second, they wanted as little medical treatment as possible, as the girl's fate
should rest in God's hands. 179
In the case of Jodie and Mary, the courts may determine that the right of the
parents to religious freedom may be outweighed by the concern for the welfare of
both children. 8 ° In Mary's case, the concern may be that she be allowed to die
with dignity and not "cause" the death of her sister. 18 ' For Jodie, it is the belief
18 2
that she be allowed to live as the twin with the best chance for survival.
Furthermore, Prince recognizes that when state action impinges on religious
freedom it is appropriate when "shown to be necessary for or conducive to the
child's protection against some clear and present danger."' 18 3 The state could argue
for action because Mary and Jodie face a clear and present danger, namely death.
The Court makes one last important distinction in the Prince case: "Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free...
to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves."' 84 Jodie and Mary are
not old enough to make a decision about their medical treatment but this does not
mean their parents are free to make them martyrs. 85 It may186be helpful to try to
determine what Jodie and Mary may want if they could speak.
In the cases of Baby K and Jodie, the parents were asked to choose between
medical treatment and their religious beliefs.1 8 7 For most people it is too difficult
"to imagine being confronted with the choice of either complying with the law or
complying with deeply held religious beliefs, with the life of a child hanging in the
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7; see Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 817.
See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7.
See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 817.
See id.
See id. at 726.

180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 170.

185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.; In the Matter of Baby "K", supra note 7.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 30:4

balance."1 88 The cases of Baby K and Jodie and Mary can be distinguished. In the
case of Baby K, the mother wanted medical treatment to be continued even though
the doctor deemed it to be futile, as the baby would not recover. The mother
believed that her daughter's life had value and that if it was God's will to perform
a miracle, he would.'8 9 God should decide the moment of death, not the doctors. 90
The mother believed in medical treatment to keep her daughter alive. The parents
of Jodie and Mary wanted as little medical intervention as possible because they
believed that it was God's will that their children were bom conjoined. The central
difference between the two concerns the use or withholding of medical treatment.
V. CONCLUSION

The medical and legal ethics of conjoined twins present an interesting and
controversial debate. On one hand parents should be free to make difficult medical
decisions for their minor children without question by the courts. On the other
hand, if a child can be saved with medical attention, the child should have the
opportunity to receive treatment. The entire situation is complicated by issues of
religion, cost, uncertain outcomes and inherent differences. I fully sympathize
with the parent's difficult decisions. No parent wants to make this difficult
"Sophie's Choice"' 191 type of decision where if one child is not chosen to live then
both die. The situation of Jodie and Mary differs from "Sophie's Choice," in that
the parents had no choice for Mary. With or without medical intervention, Mary
would die. Jodie would die if she was not separated from Mary. The ultimate
choice here is the decision to save one child.
While these decisions are usually left to the parents, there may be situations
where the court can advise doctors about the legality of other options. However,
courts should not make decisions regarding medical care. This should be done by
families and doctors.
One such example of parents' actions without court intervention is the
Lakeburg Twins. 192 Amy and Angela Lakeburg were born on June 29, 1993, at

Loyola University's Chicago Medical Center. 93 The twins shared a six-chamber
heart and a liver, but had separate brains, lungs, kidneys and gastrointestinal
tracts.'94 Congestive heart failure was a major concern because one heart was
supporting both bodies. 195 Neither twin would survive conjoined, but there was a
one percent chance of survival beyond infancy for one twin.196 The twins
188. Plastine, supra note 146, at 124.
189. See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7.
190. Baby "K," supra note 134.
191. See WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1976).
192. See David C. Thomasnia, et. al, The Ethics of Caringfor Conjoined Twins. The Lakeburg
Twins, 26 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 4 (1996).
193. Thomasma, et. al, supra note 192. The parents did not have insurance. See Charles J.
Dougherty, A Life-and-Death Decision: The Lakeburg Twins, 74 HEALTH PROGRESS 16 (1993).
194. Id. SEGAL, supra note 3, at 307.
195. Thomasma et. al., supra note 192, at 5.
196. See Dougherty, supra note 193, at 16. The total bill was at least $500,000. Id.
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presented a major ethical dilemma. Should one twin be sacrificed for another even
if there was little chance either twin would survive? The physicians recommended
against the surgery because of the poor chance for survival and poor quality of
life. 19 7 The mother thought that she "could not live with herself if she did not at
least try to save one life."' 198 In this case, one twin was sacrificed for the other
twin. The doctors choose Angela for life and Amy for death. 199

197. SEGAL, supra note 3, at 308.
198. Thomasma et. al, supra note 192, at 5.
199. Id.

